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ABSTRACT 
The UK’s Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF) is the largest pay-for-performance 
scheme in the world. This ethnographic study explored how QOF’s monetary logic 
influences the approach to healthcare in UK general practice. From August 2013 to April 
2014, we researched two UK general practice surgeries and one general practice training 
programme. These environments provided the opportunity for studying various spaces 
such as QOF meetings, consultation rooms, QOF recoding sessions, and the collection of 
computer-screen images depicting how patients’ biomarkers are evaluated and costed 
through software systems. QOF as a biomedical technology has led to the 
commodification of patients and their bodies. This complex phenomenon breaks down 
into three main themes: commodification of patients, QOF as currency, and valuing 
commodities. Despite the ostensible aim of QOF being to improve healthcare in general 
practice, it is accompanied by a body commodification process. The interface between 
patients and care providers has been commodified, with QOF’s pricing mechanism and 
fragmentation of care provision performing an important role in animating the UK 
economy.  
Keywords: Commodification; Pay-for-Performance; Health Technology; Health    
Policy; Clinical Governance; Audit Culture; General Practice; United Kingdom. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The National Health Service (NHS) has come to symbolise the spirit of solidarity of a 
nation that chose in 1948 to have a universal health system based on strong primary care 
services, within which general practice (family medicine) plays a central role. The 
existing cumulative evidence suggests that countries with these kinds of principles 
organising health care generally have better health outcomes (McCarthy, 2014). 
Conceptually, the NHS represents a tax-based third party payment system, which 
‘attempts to socialise the financial risks of ill-health by a pooling of risk and of financial 
provision’ (Harrison, 1998, p.16). This creates a situation that discourages the 
commodification of health care provision as a ‘product’ to be consumed according to 
patients’ purchasing power.  
In 1991, Margaret Thatcher’s conservative government introduced a division into the 
NHS, a previously monolithic public structure, by creating a purchaser-provider ‘split’. 
Self-governing hospital trusts became ‘the providers’, whereas the former health care 
authorities and General Practice (GP) fundholders became ‘purchasers’ (Laing et al., 
1998). In this novel arrangement GPs would receive a budget to buy services on behalf of 
their patients from any public or private provider (e.g. hospital). The underlying idea was 
that money would follow the patients, increasing their choices and introducing 
competition within the system. Currently, the Clinical Commissioning Group (CCG) has 
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a purchaser role in the NHS. Thus, rather than having an external relation with patients as 
consumers of health care services, the NHS has a built-in market relation amongst its 
own competing organisations. This market context provides a fertile ground for the 
increasing commodification of health and healthcare. According to Polanyi, the 
‘commodity concept is a mechanism of the market’ (2001, p.72). Polanyi empirically 
defines commodities ‘as objects produced for sale on the market; markets, again, are 
empirically defined as actual contacts between buyers and sellers’ (ibid.). 
In principle, not all things are alienable for selling due to either their symbolic meaning 
(Lock & Nguyen, 2010) or their very nature such as land, labour, and money (Polanyi, 
2001). For Lukács commodification stems from the relation people assume with ‘the 
character of things’ (1971, p.83) and is a process of reification, since commodities have a 
‘phantom objectivity’. As Lukács contends, a commodity ‘acquires an autonomy that 
seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental 
nature: the relation between people’ (ibid.). To regard a commodity as an object 
possessing intrinsic value is to deny its sociality. Thus, commodities can be considered 
objects of ‘economic value…based on judgments about them by subjects’ (Appadurai, 
1986, p.4). This kind of commodity fiction is an essential step in the market economy to 
the extent that ‘no arrangement or behaviour should be allowed to exist that might 
prevent the actual functioning of the market mechanism on the lines of the commodity 
fiction’ (Polanyi, 2001, p.73).  
Echoing this reasoning, Scheper-Hughes states that commodification transforms the body 
into a ‘highly fetishized’ object, one ‘that can be bartered, sold or stolen in divisible and 
alienable parts’ (2001, p.1). She argues that commodification encompasses ‘all 
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capitalised economic relations between humans in which human bodies are the token of 
an economic exchange that are often masked as something else - love, altruism, pleasure, 
kindness’ (ibid.). This definition comprises two important stances when applied to the 
NHS: first, the notion of the body as a ‘token of exchange’; second, the masking 
discourses around quality of care, health improvements, and disease prevention (Heath, 
2010). Mirroring this definition, the introduction of the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework (QOF) in UK general practice, the largest pay-for-performance scheme in the 
world (Roland, 2004), represents a step further in the process of health commodification 
in the NHS. To determine this process, we first present a brief account of 1990 and 2004 
contracts followed by the 2013/14 QOF contract to explain the mechanism underpinning 
QOF’s rules. Second, we describe the way we carried out ethnographic fieldwork in two 
UK general practice surgeries and a GP training programme. We go on to demonstrate 
that the adoption of QOF has been accompanied by a literal commodification process in 
the NHS by not only commodifying general practice healthcare but also patients’ bodies.  
General Practitioner’s 1990 - 2004 contracts 
Since the creation of the NHS, GPs have managed to maintain the role of independent 
contractors. This arrangement produced non-homogeneous clinical care standards that 
challenged the government aspirations to standardise quality across general practice 
(Pereira Gray, 1977). The 1990 contract increased GPs’ accountability by implementing 
targets to improve quality standards. A greater specification of the terms of services 
delivered was introduced through a fee-for-service pay modality, built around health 
promotion activities such as health checks for new patients or those aged between 16 and 
74 who have not seen a GP within the previous three years, and regular checks for the 
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over-75s (Lewis, 1998). GPs’ dissatisfaction with the 1990 top-down contract was 
registered as follows: 
[It was] one thing to have clinical advice issued as guidance, but to be told when 
to measure blood pressure, test a urine sample, or ask for a family history in the 
regulations of an act of parliament is another dimension altogether. (BMJ, 1989, 
p.414) 
The 1990 contract also reduced the ‘practice basic allowance’ (a standard salary 
component) from 60% to 45% in order to increase capitation fees and competition among 
GPs (Day, 1992, p.168). These changed conditions challenged GPs’ professionalism 
since disagreements persisted between GPs and the government around the definition of 
quality standards in general practice (Lewis, 1998). 
The question then becomes why GPs as a professional body decided, in 2004, to accept 
QOF in order to be told, as stated above, when ‘to measure blood pressure, test a urine 
sample, or ask for a family history’? The NHS internal market played an important role in 
this process, alongside a cultural transformation in general practice required to absorb the 
government’s quality aspirations. It took more than 10 years to acculturate GPs to the 
requirements of an evidence-based medicine (EBM) model of learning and practice  
(Roland, 2004). EBM allowed the British government to build a strong clinical 
governance system (Harrison et al., 2002) aiming to reduce variability in clinical care, 
thereby facilitating the conditions for the introduction of the GPs’ 2004 contract. 
Although portrayed as ‘voluntary’ (Roland, 2004), the QOF scheme constituted a 
vertically imposed framework for it represents roughly 25% of GPs’ annual income 
(Checkland et al., 2008).  Thus apart from the political and epistemological changes 
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summarised above, the 2004 contract was financially very attractive to them. It secured 
both a ‘Minimum Practice Income Guarantee’ (MPIG) – a form of income protection 
(National Audit Office, 2008, p.15), and money to improve practices’ IT systems in 
connection with the QOF (Peckham, 2007). Additionally, GPs could opt to renounce the 
out-of-hours care duty as long as they were willing to lose £6000 year, this despite most 
of them already paying an average of £13,000 year for a deputising service (National 
Audit Office, 2008, p.19)! Thus the majority of GPs gave up their 24/7 commitments and 
obtained an average pay rise of £7000 year. As well as these economic advantages, 
mechanisms within the QOF scheme enabled further financial gains. For example, in 
2006 a major change to QOF raised the number of clinical domain indicators from 11 to 
19 clinical areas (BMA, 2006). The average payment to GP partners increased by 58% in 
the first three years of the new contract (National Audit Office, 2008, p.19).  
QOF 2013/14 contract year  
In April 2014, QOF marked its tenth anniversary. Although its efficacy remains disputed, 
as documented in a systematic review (Gillam, 2012) and despite it having cost the NHS 
an estimated £1 billion a year (Raleigh & Klazinga, 2013), the government renewed its 
commitment to QOF by producing a sixth edition of the QOF contract. This 2013/14 
contract aimed at further improvements to quality by tightening up GPs’ points 
achievements, reducing the total number of points available, and changing the indicators 
for which points could be won (Gillam & Steel, 2013). A total of 900 QOF points were 
available, with each QOF point on average worth £156.92. Table 1 summarises the whole 
2013/14 QOF scheme including its four domains and points allocation.  
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Table 1. 2013/14 QOF domains and points allocation criteria. 
 
Components of 
total points score 
Points Way in which points are calculated 
Clinical Indicators   610 Achieving pre-set standards in management of: 
   
• Atrial fibrillation 
• CHD 
• Heart Failure 
• Hypertension 
• Peripheral Arterial 
Disease 
• Stroke and TIA 
• Diabetes Mellitus 
• Hypothyroidism 
• Asthma 
• COPD 
 
 
• Dementia 
• Depression  
• Mental Health 
• Cancer 
• Chronic Kidney Disease 
• Epilepsy 
• Learning Difficulty 
• Osteoporosis 
• Rheumatoid Arthritis 
• Palliative Care 
Public Health (PH) 
domain  
113 Achieving pre-set standards in: 
• Cardiovascular Prevention 
• Blood Pressure 
• Obesity  
• Smoking 
 
PH sub-domains 44 Achieving pre-set standards in: 
• Cervical Screening 
• Child Health Surveillance 
• Maternity Services 
• Contraceptive Services 
 
Quality and 
Productivity 
100 Achieving pre-set standards in: 
• A set of management arrangements to reduce patients 
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domain avoidable referral to secondary and A&E services 
 
Patient domain 
 
33       Consultation length (no less than 10 min) 
Total possible 900  
CHD = Coronary Heart Disease; COPD = Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease; 
TIA= Transient Ischemic Attack. 
Source: BMA, 2013. 
Being a points-based system, QOF functions as an audit mechanism that sets criteria and 
standards intended to measure the quality of care (Gillam, 2012). Criteria refer to QOF’s 
clinical indicators (Table 1), and the standards establish a range of point achievements, 
whose number is set by policy-makers, for each criterion. Due to the amount of money 
linked to a particular QOF indicator, GP practices can be driven to prioritise certain 
targets. Table 2, for example, describes the clinical criteria, standards, and points’ 
allocation for hypertension indicators. Note that HYP002 is worth fewer points than 
HYP003, making the latter financially more significant. Based on two components (ratio 
and range of achievement) practices can calculate the level of achievement for each QOF 
indicator. For instance, the desired quality standard for achievement of the newly 
introduced HYP003 ranges from 40 to 80% of the target registered patients. QOF offers 
50 points for this indicator. Thus, if 60% of a practice’s registered patients aged 79 or 
under with hypertension have their last blood pressure reading of 140/90mmHg or less in 
the preceding nine months the practice will receive 20/40 (i.e. half of the 25 points 
available, since 20 corresponds to what exceeds 40% which is the lower threshold).  
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Table 2. QOF indicators for hypertension (HYP): criteria, standards and points allocation.  
Indicators for ongoing management  Points Achievement 
threshold  
 
HYP002: the percentage of patients with hypertension in whom 
the last blood pressure reading (measured in preceding nine 
months) is 159/90 mmHg or less. 
 
10 44-84% 
HYP003: the percentage of patients aged 79 or under with 
hypertension in whom the last blood pressure reading (measured 
in preceding nine months) is 140/90 mmHg or less. 
NICE 2012 menu ID: NM 53 
 
50 40-80% 
Source: BMA, 2013.  
 
Built into the mathematics of the QOF is exception reporting. Designed as a safeguard for 
patients, exception reporting aims to avoid ‘harmful treatment resulting from the 
application of quality targets to patients for whom they were not intended’ (Gravelle et 
al., 2008, p.1). It recognises that not all patients are suitable candidates for medical 
interventions, either for clinical reasons (e.g. ‘patient unsuitability’ or ‘on maximum 
tolerated treatment’) or because patients refuse the treatment offered, referred to as 
‘informed dissent’ (Campbell et al., 2011).  
The QOF rules permit a flexibility that raised concerns among policy-makers and 
researchers alike. This leeway allows for manipulation of data in the practice’s pursuit of 
financial gain, either by changing the numerator or denominator that has elsewhere been 
referred to as ‘gaming’ (Gravelle et al., 2008, p.2). To reduce the chances of gaming, the 
Primary Care Trust (PCT) (replaced by the CCG from April 2014) carries out an annual 
inspection in which a GP with managerial responsibilities is usually included (Roland, 
2004). However, the available budget limits thoroughgoing examinations of statistical 
outliers (Doran et al., 2008, p.283).  
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METHODS 
This ethnographic study explored how QOF’s monetary logic influences the approach to 
healthcare in UK general practice. The main units of analysis were two general practices 
in Britain and their health staff during the QOF 2013/14 contract year. The selection of 
research sites was non-probabilistic and pragmatic (Kuper et al., 2008) since the most 
important priority was to be accepted by the GPs. The strategy adopted to gain access to 
GP surgeries entailed sifting through a network of potential general practices associated 
with a GP training programme (GPTP). The time spent in the GPTP resulted in the 
inclusion of this space as a complementary research site. The main researcher AHN, 
himself a primary care physician, attended most of the third year GPTP 2013-14 and 
conducted a focus group. The contacts made and confidence inspired in attendees by this 
approach gained him access to the two GP surgeries included in the study.  
 
Practice profiles  
The two GP practices in this study are practice groups and also training practices. As 
such, they are required to achieve both pre-established standards of care and high QOF 
scores. The surgeries provide services to a registered patient population of 15000 and 
17000 patients respectively, and hence are considered big practice groups (Checkland & 
Harrison, 2010).  
Focusing on QOF as a biomedical technology, these two surgeries can be regarded as 
representative of one space: the general practice environment (GPE). Each practice 
offered complementary inputs regarding QOF in the GPE, since spaces and contexts that 
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were not covered (or difficult to reach) in one surgery tended to be covered in the other 
and vice-versa. The main characteristics of both research sites are summarised in Table 3.  
Table 3.  Practice ‘A’ and practice ‘B’ main characteristics in 2013/14.  
Main characteristics Practice ‘A’ Practice ‘B’ 
QOF overall achievement 2012/13 98.4% 99.6% 
Training practice  Yes  Yes  
Population size 15,000 17,000 
Personal list of patients No No 
Branches Four Two 
Socioeconomic  The main surgery caters for upper 
economic social class while the 
remaining three surgeries cover 
more socio-economically deprived 
areas. 
The main surgery caters for a mix of 
social economic classes though 
socio-economically deprived 
predominates. The second surgery 
clearly covers a very deprived 
community. 
Business model Partnership Salaried 
Chronic disease management Mixed of GPs and nurses led 
services. 
Mainly a nurse team led clinics. 
 
 
Data collection methods  
Fieldwork started in mid-August 2013 in the GPTP, then expanded with the inclusion of 
the first medical group at the beginning of November and the second medical group at the 
beginning of December. The research took place during the surgeries’ opening hours 
from Monday to Friday, apart from Wednesday activities at the GPTP. Fieldwork 
concluded with preparations for the QOF 2014/15 contract year in April 2014. Methods 
comprised participant-observation of practice teams’ activities starting with receptionists, 
administrative and managerial staff and expanding progressively to cover practice 
meetings in general, meetings about QOF in particular, and observations of clinical 
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consultations conducted by GPs, nurse practitioners, practice nurses, and health care 
assistants.  A total of 326 GP consultations were observed: 218 (67%) in practice ‘A’ and 
108 (33%) in practice ‘B’, reflecting the difference in the amount of time spent in each 
practice.  
In both medical groups the following QOF specific activities were recorded: (a) QOF 
meetings; (b) QOF recoding/amendment sessions (e.g. searching for evidence of 
miscoding or QOF coding that might damage practices’ achievement in a particular QOF 
indicator); (c) doing QOF tasks over the phone such as asking patients about their 
smoking status, level of physical activities (GPPAQ), and doing dietary reviews for 
diabetic patients; (d) private explanations and demonstrations of the QOF operational 
system; and (e) a training session on QOF for a new member of staff, which was video-
recorded. Interviews with the practice team were conducted in their own workspaces such 
as consultation rooms and offices. Depending on professionals’ willingness and time 
availability the recorded interactions varied considerably from minutes (for a short 
interview) to hours (in the case of recording consecutive QOF-task activities, such as 
amending QOF codes). The latter was not fully transcribed as it contained environmental 
noises, long silences periods, and non-QOF related parallel conversations. A focus group 
conducted with four GP trainers in the GPTP lasted approximately one hour and was 
fully transcribed (Table 4). 
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Table 4. Summary of audio-data collected according to research settings.  
 *Recorded by more than one encounter. #Recorded as participant in QOF meetings. 
The study methods allowed for data triangulation whereby a particular phenomenon 
could be checked against different sites and along different time-space moments (Reeves 
et al., 2008). This data collection strategy is a well-known way of improving the 
reliability of the material gathered (Murphy et al., 1999). For instance, practice meetings’ 
decisions were cross-checked with health staff, in order to verify what was collectively 
agreed during practice meetings. This approach facilitated a better understanding of QOF 
Participants Code Activity Duration Transcription 
 
GPs 
  
GP1 
GP2 
GP3 
GP4 
 
Focus group with 
GPs in the GPTP 
 
0:56:52 In full 
 
GPs 
 
GP5 
GP6 
GP7 
GP8 
GP9 
GP10 
GP11* 
GP12 
GP13 
GP14 
 
 
Opportunistic 
interviews & 
observation and 
discussion during 
recoding of QOF 
amendments 
 
0:25:54 
0:34:53 
1:19:13 
0:14:38 
0:15:29 
0:30:42 
8:00:44 
0:22:42 
0:21:22 
0:12:43 
 
 
In full 
In full 
In parts 
In full 
In full 
In full 
In parts 
In full 
In full 
In full 
Nurse N1 
N2* 
N3 
N4* 
 
Opportunistic 
interviews 
0:20:31 
0:53:40 
0:45:45 
2:27:45 
In parts 
In parts 
In parts 
In parts 
 
Managerial functions 
 
MF1 
MF2 
MF3# 
MF4 
MF5 
MF6# 
MF7# 
MF8# 
MF9# 
 
Interviews, 
descriptive 
interviews or when 
taking part in QOF 
meetings 
 
0:44:33 
0:45:52 
 
1:34:12 
0:58:41 
In full 
In full 
 
In parts 
In full 
QOF Meetings M1 
M2 
M3 
M4 
 
Meeting interaction 0:22:23 
1:22:08 
0:58:34 
1:10:48 
 
In full 
In parts 
In parts 
In parts 
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managerial influence over general practice by ‘following the QOF’ through different 
places (cf. Marcus, 1998). Other data sources included documents such as official 
statements (GMS contracts), the results of computer screen captures, practice profile 
booklets, and practice websites.  
Data Analysis  
Data analysis was an iterative process, whereby the literature and the data collected on 
the ground were constantly producing mutual feedback loops, in a ‘theme generation 
cycle’ (Reeves et al., 2008). This led to a refinement and narrowing of the inquiry as 
fieldwork progressed. The activity of transcribing the recorded material, re-reading, and 
contrasting it with other empirical evidence strengthened the process of data analysis. By 
contrasting and comparing the data and elements selected, it was possible to prioritise 
themes based on their ‘sameness’. As Atwood et al. point out, ‘sameness here does not 
mean complete identity between objects, just a sufficient similarity’ (1986, p.138). The 
iterative nature of this ethnographic study combined with the principal researcher’s non-
UK family physician status and medical anthropological reflections from AJR and CM 
enhanced the reflexivity of the data analysis process, shaping the understanding of the 
QOF managerial environment, and consequently the research results.  
Ethics 
This research was granted approval by Durham University’s Department of 
Anthropology Research Ethics and Data Protection Committee in January 2013. The 
NHS Health Research Authority (HRA) did not request a full ethics committee review 
since although the protocol stated the principal researcher would sometimes be in the 
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same room as patients in the course of observing clinicians' management of QOF tasks 
during their consultations, the HRA deemed our research did not directly involve patients 
as main research subjects. The required clinical governance approval by a primary care 
trust (PCT) research department was sought and obtained in February 2013.  
RESULTS  
There were three themes identified through the data analysis process which we shall use 
as the framework for presenting our key findings.  They were: (1) Commodification of 
patients; (2) QOF as currency; and (3) Valuing commodities.  
Commodification of patients  
The commodification process in general practice became apparent early on. In the focus 
group, it seemed that GPs perceived as a menace to their business the changes made in 
the 2013/14 contract. These changes aimed to correct QOF’s induced distortions via 10% 
reduction in GPs’ income (Roland & Guthrie, 2016). One GP explicitly expressed this 
concern, as follows:  
‘Now patients are walking bags of money that you have to get money off...by 
doing certain tasks...instead of a patient that you should be just saying: “- We’ve 
got [a] problem and we need to...” and that’s a danger, you know.’ [GP1]  
This idea of patients being recast as ‘walking bags of money’ and its embedded ‘danger’ 
refers to potential ethical conflicts of interest that QOF has insinuated into general 
practice health teams (Pellegrino, 1999). In the initial phase of learning how QOF was 
organised in the GP surgeries, there was an opportunity to have two separate meetings 
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with managerial staff lasting roughly 45 minutes each. In these meetings, managerial staff 
went into detailed explanations about the software package System One’s main 
operational characteristics with regard to QOF and its utility in helping staff keep track of 
the QOF indicators. The managerial staff used patients’ electronic records to clarify some 
points. What follows shows the role of managerial staff in monitoring QOF targets, and 
the idiosyncratic nature of QOF’s commodification process.  
‘So, I use these reports quite a lot...it’s also good for “target patients”, see...you 
can either sort it by who is the most profitable to us…and we could chase that 
patient or who has the most [QOF] alerts’. [MF2]  
In the above extract, the IT system permits the managerial team to classify patients in 
terms of profitability, triggering ‘a chase’ of the selected individuals. Figure 1 is a screen-
capture demonstrating the monetary values attached to each patient. It is a powerful 
reflection of the statement that patients are ‘walking bags of money’. The QOF scheme, 
by pricing patients, allocates each a monetary value, which varies according to the 
number of disease conditions ascribed to them. This generates ‘chasing patients’ as a 
repetitive trope, one of the consequences of the commodification process (McDonald et 
al., 2007).  
Figure 1 shows a list of patients with their corresponding numbers of QOF alerts and 
their consequent value, collated according to how much a patient was worth to the 
practice. Furthermore, it highlights the patient with the highest number of QOF alerts 
(24), totalling £48.04 in value. When this patient was selected, the software automatically 
displayed the QOF-tasks that needed to be performed. In this case highlighted in a drop-
 
 
 17 
box on the right-hand side of Figure 1, these QOF-tasks concerned five health-related 
issues: coronary heart disease (CHD), chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), 
diabetes (DM), smoking (SMOK), and stroke and transient ischemic attack (STIA). 
Hence QOF, structured by such ‘disease management protocols (to improve outcomes, 
reduce costs, and standardise care), is, in effect, providing programmed service 
commodities’ (Stoeckle, 2000, p.141), embedded in the special clinics for diabetes, 
COPD/asthma, and so on.  
 
Figure 1. List of target patients collated by patients’ monetary value [names removed].  
 
As well as being commodified, patients as units of care become fragmented by the 
disease-oriented model QOF uses. To summarise, the QOF’s fragmentary approach to 
health care links GPs’ income to selected portions of general practice activities, divided 
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into small countable and auditable units. Then, a monetary value is attached to each unit, 
creating a spectrum of possible financial gains. These units are assembled into several 
disease management templates, producing a series of small boxes to be ticked or filled up 
with short pieces of information that allow for easy extraction and/or for an audit to be 
performed (Checkland et al., 2007). This process of fragmentation was nicely depicted by 
a GP:  
‘The problem with this whole area is: it’s the classic cliché that we use: “salami 
slicing work”…[producing] lots of little bits, and we end up with the huge 
sausage, that’s exactly what it is!’ [GP1]  
As Sharp (2000, p.288) contends, such a conceptualisation of the human body carries the 
potential for its dehumanisation and decomposition since ‘one explores how (literally and 
symbolically) fragmentation and commodification occur’. Based on the biomedical 
model, QOF has a very mechanistic approach to the human body (Checkland et al., 
2008). 
 
QOF as currency  
The whole process of commodification became even clearer later on during fieldwork 
while witnessing a QOF ‘code amendment’ (i.e. recoding) activity. This is a new 
behaviour generated by QOF, and entails GPs or qualified nurses looking at certain 
targets and checking for coding issues (Swinglehurst & Greenhalgh, 2015). During a 
recoding session the issue about the QOF points’ framework and its translation into 
monetary units emerged. The following excerpts further illustrate the commodification 
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process, and the way it turns QOF into a currency:  
GP11: Four pounds per patient…so, if you get 100-point patients, you get £400; 
so...what 200 patients? You get £800…To get maximum target...we are...[lower 
voice while making calculations]...£1700 off...No! More than 
that!...yeah...‘missing  patients’...  
AHN: The total is this? £4700 and you’re currently £3000...  
GP11: Pounds achieved at the moment [£1700] and pounds achievable is 
£3000...so, we’re £3000 off...so we could get £3000...  
AHN: OK...so, a lot of money...  
The discussion above refers to the amount of money involved in each of the QOF clinical 
domain areas, and the package of commodified services that has been commissioned by 
the government for GPs to deliver as a quality standard. This can be characterised as 
‘government induced demand’ for health services, since patients do not request QOF 
before, during or after the consultation. Different from a ‘free-market’ self-regulated 
ideology, the government is animating the UK economy via the QOF biomedical 
framework. In the continuation of the same dialogue, the GP scans through several QOF 
clinical areas, not necessarily identifying them singularly:  
GP11: So, it’s really difficult to say how much we can get...so, you know, so £12? 
I wouldn’t worry about that; £37...hmm? [Hesitating]...you know...it’s in their 
hundreds that we’ll be looking at...OK, GPPAQ [GP Physical Activity 
Questionnaire] £3000...this...£1009...£770...[for] risk assessment...and I need to 
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look at...and that’s only three patients...  
AHN: So, three patients are worth more than... 
 GP11: £259 per patient, if I can get those three...  
AHN: Wow! It’s quite an imbalance! 
GP11: Hmm, yeah, so...you know, there are some we get a lot more for and some 
we don’t get much at all...OK...  
AHN: How do they decide how...this condition’s worth more than the others?  
GP11: I have no idea...I’ve got no idea...OK, so that £1300 to 
review...OK...so...it’s achievable...this one we’re very annoyed about it: how do 
we not get the cholesterol under five...for secondary prevention for heart 
disease?!...We have to get that...so people are not acting...on the blood results.  
The above quotation illustrates the imbalances in QOF’s value allocation. This 
partly reflects the extent to which the points allocated to each ‘package service’ 
do not necessarily match health staff workload outputs. There is a detachment 
from what is called ‘socially necessary labour-time’ in commodity production that 
aggregates value to a commodity, i.e. ‘the amount of labour-time necessary for 
the production of each’, which refers to the ‘use value’ of a commodity 
(Timmermans & Almeling, 2009, p.23). Thus, the disproportion in the allocation 
of value, and who decides upon a target’s relevance for general practice, is a 
completely alien dimension for health staff. The QOF points’ allocation fluctuates 
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according to what policy-makers want practice teams to concentrate on. By 
analysing what is being exchanged and its attached value, it is possible to ‘argue 
that what creates the link between exchange and value is politics, construed 
broadly’ (Appadurai, 1986, p.3). 
In the previous dialogue, one can assess, read and sense the monetary currency exchange 
of QOF: A form of ‘QOF money’ (which we propose to identify as £-QOF) has been put 
in circulation within UK general practice. This £-QOF is then linked to body biomarkers 
and health conditions.  
Valuing commodities  
The recoding sessions can sometimes seem a ‘waste of time’, but are equally a ‘money-
making’ opportunity, as a GP was explaining to managerial colleagues during one QOF 
meeting [M1].  
‘There’s not many things in QOF where your limited number of patients buys you 
so many points; and I’ve managed to pick up lots of ones like...cardiovascular, 
there’re 8.5 out of 10 [points now] and [it] was actually zero, but we were only 
dealing with 17 patients. So, I managed to get...this...you know, whom I said, you 
know, whom I said sometimes...I’m bragging, I’ve said: - “I can make you £4000 
in one session” [gently laughing]...you can, if you go from nil to ten [QOF 
points]…So...my time so far it’s been really good value, but unfortunately it gets 
less and less...but I’ve picked up the learning disability...the Down 
Syndrome...we’ve got one patient and he’s worth...three points.’ [GP5]  
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The above extract illustrates that attaching money is a powerful tool for reshaping 
healthcare services by ‘commodifying’ patients themselves or their biologically extracted 
by-products. The QOF commodification mechanism attaches points to patients’ bodily 
biomarkers (i.e. level of cholesterol, blood pressure, and haemoglobin A1c). This 
procedure results in token-information that is exchanged for pounds.  
The £-QOF conditions things that practices must do in order to generate their revenue. 
This potentially distorts healthcare services, as targets become highly fetishized proxies 
for bodies and body parts. Scheper-Hughes (2001) revealed the harvesting, trade and 
commoditization of organs and body parts in the global economy. We contend that 
although our case study does not deal in actual tissues’ and organs’ removal and 
marketization, the patient’s body undergoes a comparable type of mining activity to 
extract a monetary value that is attached to its component parts, albeit electronically 
stored and exchanged. The following utterance highlights this process:  
‘There’s osteoporosis, we haven’t hit it [yet], diabetes, we’ve still only got three 
greens [out of 13], so we haven’t hit it; we need 130 patients for blood pressure, 
286…Oh! We only need four microalbumin! Oh, we’ve done well on that, then, 
you know, that’s a protein but we need 211 urine tests, to get the money or 
otherwise we don’t get it! […] And this time of the year it’s an absolutely 
nightmare for us, because…this time of the year it’s almost like: “-We haven’t hit 
the QOF, we haven’t hit the QOF, we haven’t done this, we haven’t done [that]!”’ 
[N4]. 
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The above utterance underscores two points: (1) the need to chase patients for clinical 
review and to extract their by-products, which are then transformed into ‘QOF-bytes’, 
stored as backup information to be exchanged at the end of each financial year in order to 
generate practice revenue; (2) the fluctuation of QOF requirements throughout the 
financial year. The QOF’s financial deadline at the end of March triggers a ‘nightmare 
climate’ as the pressure increases to accommodate the remaining patients and QOF tasks 
from December onwards:  
 
‘This happens every year as soon as Christmas is over, it’s like: - “The QOF is 
coming! The QOF is...” or “-How many points are we at? How many?” you 
know?’ [N4] 
 
‘I think you really need to keep things on a month-to-month basis…but no matter 
how much you try to do that it always has…it always seems to build up at back 
end of the [financial] year.’ [MF5] 
 
‘And we get a “mad panic”… from about February to April…because we haven’t 
documented things appropriately in previous parts of the year.’ [GP12] 
 
General practice teams are more affected by QOF demands towards the end of financial 
year, i.e. 31
st
 March. This seasonality represents an ‘anomaly’ or a ‘noise’ produced by 
QOF’s asymmetry with reality. This is portrayed as a ‘time of madness’, ‘panic’ and 
‘nightmare’, pushing practice teams to behave almost like ‘data harvesters’, to borrow a 
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term used by Loxterkamp (2013). This fiscal seasonality reveals QOF’s artificiality, 
bringing with it several interconnected problems, since in a short period of time the 
practice has to undertake an enormous number of consultations, clinical reviews, and 
laboratory tests in order to achieve QOF targets. Despite health staff’s enduring 
commitment to providing the best care, QOF challenges their autonomy (Campbell et al., 
2008), holism (Checkland et al., 2008) and longitudinal approaches to patient care as 
practice teams reach QOF’s financial year deadline. 
 
DISCUSSION  
The NHS, formerly the product of a strong welfare state aiming to protect UK citizens 
and residents when they fell sick, is insidiously becoming a space for a market economy 
logic for healthcare provision. The NHS’s approach to health discouraged the functioning 
of the market mechanism with its associated ‘commodity fiction’ (Polanyi, 2001). 
Nevertheless, since the initiation of the internal-market in 1991 this protective bubble has 
shifted towards a slicing process, framed within a market economy of ‘buyers and 
sellers’. The intention was that the purchaser-provider split would self-regulate prices and 
the demand for health services. This scenario would, inevitably - so the argument went - 
drive quality standards up through competition between providers. The internal market 
can be seen as the first step to treating health as a ‘commodity’ regulated by a 
purchaser/provider framework within the NHS. 
The QOF scheme has added a further tier of sophistication to the commodification 
process in the NHS, at least in primary care. This financial incentive framework treats 
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health as a commodity based on patients’ token-information exchange linked to each 
QOF indicators’ criteria. To commoditise the relation between patients and health care 
providers, a classificatory normative system has developed. This clusters unique cases in 
order to provide a pattern against which the health staff’s output can be measured, 
assessed or audited (Harrison, 2009, p.191). This is what QOF does, supported by EBM’s 
high population-based level of abstraction (Lambert et al., 2006). QOF’s reductionist, 
‘tick box’ approach to patient care reframes human-related health conditions into ‘QOF-
able’ entities by selecting bits of complex realities and reifying them as commodities. 
These are then launched as a point-based system into the UK primary care economy, 
offering a QOF currency that can be converted into sterling pounds. 
Therefore, QOF distorts the fundamental relation health professionals assume with 
people (echoing Lukács, 1971) since it overrides (and/or substitutes) patients in this 
relational process in favour of the token information provided by their body biomarkers 
(e.g. level of cholesterol, haemoglobin A1c, proteinuria, blood pressure, FVE 1 [Forced 
Expiratory Volume in One Second]) or their disease conditions (e.g. breathlessness score 
check, feet-check, eye-check). This token-information is reified as a commodity to be 
first stored (alienated) in computer hard driver backups and later traded (exchanged) with 
a third part within a bio-managerial ‘quality’ framework.  
Social scientist Stephen Harrison (2009, p.193) framed QOF as an example of 
‘conceptual’ commodification in the NHS, suggesting that it could potentially lead to a 
literal commodification process. The present anthropological investigation confirms 
Harrison’s predictions by demonstrating the ‘literal’ commodification process at work in 
UK general practice. Literal commodification entails that goods must be ‘real’ to allow 
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for exchange, alienation, and decommodification (Harrison, 2009).  The QOF scheme 
produces token-information (i.e. real ‘goods’) that can be ‘alienated’ and ‘exchanged’, 
and does not simply frame healthcare as a service for ‘consumption’ (Harrison 2009, 
p.190). Their ‘virtual’ existence as bio-bytes does not make these goods ‘less real’. 
Additionally, policy-makers can ‘decommodify’ particular ‘bits’ of patients’ care by 
removing QOF indicators from the NHS’s internal-market. For instance, several QOF 
indicators were eliminated (‘decommodified’) including screening depression in patients 
with chronic disease, the compulsory use of formal questionnaires (e.g. PHQ-9) for 
assessing patients’ depression severity status (BMA, 2013), checking for erectile 
dysfunction in male diabetics (BMA, 2014), and screening for dementia due to the 
potential harms to patients’ well-being (Roland & Guthrie, 2016). This contributes to the 
perception that criteria for adopting QOF indicators might reflect more a blend of 
different principles and political agendas than EBM best practice ideal (Ashworth & 
Marshall, 2015). 
In QOF commodification, trade is internally oriented between government and GPs, 
bypassing the users of general practice services. By ‘salami-slicing’ what used to be a 
more holistic type of care and pricing patients’ body-component parts, the government 
opened up a ‘Pandora’s box’, which is the capitalist approach to health. This tendency 
has meaningful and striking parallels with a more general proclivity for body parts 
commodification, a process whereby ‘the human body has attained medical and 
commercial value as a mine for spare parts for research and as a therapeutic tool’ (Lock 
& Nguyen, 2010, p.208). The parallelism to the body-mining enterprise in QOF refers to 
data extraction of token-information (through urine, blood, questionnaires) about 
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patients’ biomedical parameters within a standardised quality framework.  
Previous GMS contracts lacked a detailed and monetarily linked biomedical framework 
based on robust IT surveillance systems for controlling GPs’ financial gains. This raises 
at least two ethical dilemmas: (a) the induction of biomedicalization processes in primary 
care; and (b) the conflict of interests when linking clinicians’ activities with money and 
‘quality’ standards.  
The QOF scheme epitomises a biomedicalization process as its scope ‘includes 
conceptual and clinical expansions through the commodification of health, the 
elaboration of risk and surveillance, and innovative clinical applications of drugs, 
diagnostic tests, and treatment procedures’ (Clarke et al., 2003 p.165). The treatment of 
health as commodity has benefitted the market for existing drugs: between 2004 and 
2011 ‘prescriptions for statins doubled, for angiotensin converting enzyme inhibitors (for 
blood pressure control) and diabetic drugs nearly doubled, for antidepressants rose 60%’ 
(Spence, 2013, p.f1498). In the 2012/13 QOF contract year, the expenditure on screening 
for depression in CHD and diabetic patients accounted ‘for $6 million per annum in the 
context of the $1 billion total estimated cost of QOF each year’ (McLintock et al., 2014, 
p.7). Despite this sharp increase in medicine use (National Statistics, 2014), 
cardiovascular mortality has not diminished during the QOF’s 10 years of existence 
(Kontopantelis et al., 2015).  
The UK bio-market and pharmaceutical industries seem to have benefited with QOF as 
general practice might have become ‘overactive’, consuming enormous amount of NHS 
resources as well as overmedicalizing patients. In this arrangement, GPs have represented 
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a ‘big market’ target for biomedical industries as they have been providing the daily care 
for the bulk of the UK population. This context has intensified the capitalisation within 
the NHS, clearly depicted by its ‘criteria for reimbursement, and in general, the treatment 
of health and illness as merely another field for calculations of corporate profitability’ 
(Rose, 2006, p.11).  
In terms of payment mechanism, QOF raises ethical concerns at the interface between 
health professionals and patients. Traditionally, GPs wanted to remain independent 
contractors to avoid the excesses of the NHS’s bureaucratic structure, fearing losing their 
autonomy and patients’ advocate role, although behaving as salaried individuals rather 
than businessmen (Lewis, 1998). General practice’s tradition was the pursuit of financial 
security through a mix of capitation with a salaried component (ibid.). Being paid to care 
for patients by administering limited budgets is quite different from ‘making’ money by 
exploiting potential economic gains, i.e. doing certain things instead of others because 
they are more lucrative. QOF fosters the latter, more profit-oriented approach to 
healthcare in general practice. Thus, QOF is different from previous contract 
arrangements. 
Usually, three ways exist for paying doctors that reward some aspects of their activities 
such as time (salary), workload (capitation, which is based on doctors’ list of patients), 
and procedures (fee-for-service). The caveats of these types of payment include: (a) 
salary may foster laziness and undermine productivity; (b) capitation, though more cost-
conscious form of production, may stimulate clinicians to avoid the ‘difficult’ patients 
and those with chronic conditions, hence narrowing the scope of general practice; and (c) 
fee-for-service may stimulate inadequate service provision, fraudulent codification, and 
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networks of mutual referral among professional colleagues (Robinson, 2001).  A blend of 
these three payment modalities is usually preferred. However, on top of these, the 2004 
contract introduced a pay-for-performance modality (QOF), which has parallelism with 
fee-for-service schemes as both payment modalities link money with doctors’ activities. 
Thus, QOF carries the potential to induce unnecessary demands (clinical and 
bureaucratic), data manipulation (e.g. gaming), and may divert practice staff’s activities 
to concentrate on the most profitable bits of healthcare, especially by the end of financial 
year. 
The current context makes QOF symbiotic and vital for the NHS’s internal-market and 
the UK economy. In this market environment, health as a commodity has insinuated itself 
further into the NHS through QOF’s detailed pricing mechanism based on the exchange 
of patients’ token information. In other words, QOF’s fragmentary approach to bodily 
processes commodifies patients’ bodies, behaviours, and parts into things to be traded 
within the UK internal bio-market.  
The present research provides a unique account of QOF’s literal commodification 
mechanism, highlighting important changes in UK general practice. Given the 
introduction of the internal market, it can be argued that commodification of health in the 
NHS is nothing new. However, this research is the first to demonstrate how 
commodification in general practice is occurring at the interface between patients and 
general practice health staff. Hence, the QOF scheme has pushed further a commercial 
type of medicine that produces ethical dilemmas for general practice and policy-makers.  
The researched sites are training practices, hence the phenomenon observed happened in 
what are considered practices with high quality standards. The QOF scheme’s successful 
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implementation across the country and the high levels of QOF points GPs have achieved 
(Campbell et al., 2008), suggest a consistent and effective use of this managerial tool. 
Although general practices tend to be culturally diverse environments, this cannot be 
inferred from QOF managerial strategies, which all seem to adhere quite strongly to the 
scheme’s rules. Thus, focusing on QOF as a biomedical technology permits case-to-case 
transference and generalisation of the main research findings with a reasonable degree of 
confidence (Murphy et al., 1999), despite limiting the number of surgeries for this present 
study to two. 
The present research was completed under the influence of the 2013/14 contract, 
covering a particular period (from November 2013 to April 2014) of the overall QOF 
financial year. Thus, participants’ narratives in this ethnography more compellingly 
reflect this period of the year, a time of great pressure to achieve QOF targets, and do not 
necessarily represent overall health staff’s attitudes towards QOF-tasks. This research did 
not comprise practices with personal lists of patients, small practices (single handed or 
two-to-three partners), and low-score QOF practices. These might deal with QOF 
requirements in a different way, opting for a more patient-focused approach balancing 
potential economic gains/losses against patients’ responses to clinical reviews (Alderson 
et al., 2014). Additionally, general practice allows for more nuanced approaches to 
patients’ care, accommodating different organisational logics such as population-based 
management of chronic conditions (e.g. QOF) and individualised patient care such as 
patients with medically unexplained symptoms (McDonald et al., 2013). Our study has 
focused on the former rather than on the latter aspect of clinical care. Both researched 
practices used the same software package and some of the features illustrated here might 
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be peculiar to System One. However, Swinglehurst and Greenhalgh (2015)’s study 
suggests that QOF induced behaviours are not software dependent.  
The present research suggests that QOF’s commodification process is an important 
unintended consequence, which further questions its continuity (Checkland et al., 2008; 
Ryan et al., 2016). For instance, the NHS Scotland has substituted QOF entirely by 
“quality circles” schemes. These are collaborative working groups comprising 10 to 15 
practices that together identify and develop areas that need further quality improvements 
(Roland & Guthrie, 2016). Therefore, alternative quality assurance programmes are 
required that dialogue with complex clinical care scenarios encountered in general 
practice. 
CONCLUSION  
The QOF scheme has favoured the objectification, fragmentation, and standardisation of 
the human body for quality care management in the name of improvement in health 
provision. This has forged a literal commodification process in UK general practice at the 
interface between patients and care providers. Within the NHS internal market, QOF’s 
insidious pricing mechanism and fragmentation has performed an important role in 
animating the UK economy.  
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